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Why are Fairness Concerns so Important? Lessons from
Pricing a Shared Last-Mile Transportation System
Yiwei Chen ∗ Hai Wang †
Abstract
The Last-Mile Problem refers to the provision of travel service from the nearest public trans-
portation node to the final destination. The Last-Mile Transportation System (LMTS), which
has recently emerged, provides on-demand shared last-mile transportation service. While it
is natural that in the last-mile supply chain, a high-value parcel should be charged a higher
price and deserves service priority compared to a low-value parcel, it is not straightforward
to identify an obvious pricing and service priority for an LMTS that serves passengers. In
an LMTS, a special-type passenger who has a higher valuation of service usually has a lower
waiting time disutility; i.e., the valuation of service and the waiting time disutility rate are nega-
tively correlated. In this paper, we consider two fairness guarantees—price discount and service
priority—applied to special-type passengers with higher service valuation but lower waiting time
disutility. We propose models to analyze pricing and service priority policies. We prove that
the LMTS is more profitable if a smaller price discount and no service priority are given to
special-type passengers, and this is also the case for the social welfare maximization objective.
We implement the models in a set of numerical experiments using real public transport data.
Based on both the theoretical analysis and the numerical experiments, we find that enforcing
fairness guarantees in the LMTS is critical.
Key words: Shared Transportation; Last-Mile; Fairness; Price Discount; Service Priority
1. Introduction
The Last-Mile Problem refers to the provision of travel service from the nearest public trans-
portation node to the final destination. The Last-Mile Transportation System (LMTS), which has
recently emerged, provides on-demand, shared last-mile transportation service. Several develop-
ments have boosted use of the system. First, many cities and governments are under pressure to
increase public transport’s share of urban trips in order to reduce road congestion and air pol-
lution. Urban transport planners have increasingly recognized that the unavailability of last-mile
services—which offer alternatives to walking to/from the nearest public transport station—is one of
the main deterrents to the use of public transport. Second, an aging population in many cities has
greatly increased the demand for last-mile services. Third, legal requirements to ensure adequate
mobility for certain demographic groups, such as people with physical disabilities or school children,
are becoming more common; these are also the groups most likely to need last-mile service.
∗YC is with Engineering Systems and Design, Singapore University of Technology and Design. Email:
{yiwei_chen@sutd.edu.sg}
†HW is with the School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University. Email:
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A specific last-mile region in an LMTS is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. The LMTS
serves a public transportation node, such as a rapid transit metro station at which trains dynami-
cally arrive and discharge batches of passengers over time. There are multiple types of passengers,
such as adults, senior citizens, children, and students. Passengers’ final destinations (home, work-
place, public institutions, etc.) are spatially distributed in an urban area served by the public
transportation node, and a fleet of vehicles is available to transport each passenger to her final
destination. The routes and schedules of the LMTS vehicles are flexible, and can adjust to specific
last-mile service requests. Each type of passenger has heterogeneous valuation of last-mile service
and heterogeneous disutility rate of service waiting time.
Figure 1: Schematic of a Last-Mile Region in an LMTS
The LMTS works in the following way. A passenger who needs last-mile service pays a certain
fare and informs the LMTS operator of her final destination. After receiving her request, the
LMTS operator assigns her to one of the vehicles in the LMTS fleet, plans the vehicle’s route so
that it includes a stop at her destination, estimates the vehicle’s departure time, and notifies her
accordingly. Once all of the passengers assigned to a vehicle are on board, the vehicle executes
a delivery route with stops at each passenger’s destination and returns to the station to pick up
passengers for its next delivery tour. Detailed settings for the LMTS around a last-mile region for
a metro station can be found in Wang and Odoni [2014].
Because an LMTS serves multiple types of passengers, such as adults, senior citizens, children,
and students, the LMTS operator must determine the fare of last-mile service for each type of
passenger and whether any passenger type can enjoy service priority. In practice, if the LMTS
is operated by a profit-driven commercial company, it typically aims at maximizing its profit.
If the LMTS is operated by a government agency, it typically aims at maximizing social welfare.
Therefore, we are motivated to study how the LMTS operator prices and prioritizes last-mile service
for each type of passenger to achieve its objective of either maximizing profit or social welfare.
We build a model with two types of passengers: a regular type (e.g., healthy adults; hereafter,
“adult”) that consists of able-bodied adults and a special type (e.g., senior citizens, disabled people,
children, and students) that consists of more vulnerable passengers. Special-type passengers sta-
tistically place more value on last-mile service than regular-type passengers. However, special-type
passengers incur less disutility from waiting for last-mile service than regular-type passengers.
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In this paper, we theoretically show that with the objective of either maximizing profit or social
welfare, the LMTS operator has incentive to charge special-type passengers as much as possible
and serve them after serving all regular-type passengers. However, one key reason to launch the
LMTS is to enable the entire society, and particularly those special-type passengers who are more
vulnerable, to benefit from public transport. Therefore, the policy described above fails to achieve
this goal. To ensure that special-type passengers are well protected and treated fairly, we study
two fairness constraints on the LMTS operator’s pricing and service-priority decisions. To avoid
special-type passengers’ paying too much, a fairness constraint on price discount requires that their
fare be no more than a fraction of the fare for regular-type passengers. To avoid special-type
passengers’ waiting too long, a fairness constraint on service priority requires that LMTS serves
them prior to, or at least concurrent with, regular-type passengers. We show that in the presence of
these two fairness constraints, with the objective of either maximizing profit or social welfare, the
LMTS operator’s optimal policy is to charge special-type passengers the maximum allowable price
and serve both types of passengers in a mixed way without giving priority to any type of passenger.
We also implement the models in a set of numerical experiments in diverse scenarios using real
data from the Singapore Mass Rapid Transit system. Based on both the theoretical analysis and
numerical experiments, we find that enforcing the fairness constraints in the LMTS is critical.
We also compare the passenger LMTS with another last-mile system that exists widely in prac-
tice, the freight last-mile system (also called the last-mile supply chain). A freight last-mile system
refers to the provision of logistics service for parcels sent from warehouses to their final delivery
addresses. The passenger LMTS and last-mile supply chain have the following key difference. In the
passenger LMTS, compared to regular-type passengers, special-type passengers whose valuations
on last-mile service are higher actually have lower waiting disutility rates—i.e., the valuation of the
service and the waiting disutility rate for last-mile service are negatively correlated. By contrast,
in the last-mile supply chain, customers who send/receive parcels with higher values typically have
higher waiting disutility rates—i.e., the valuation of the service and the waiting disutility rate are
positively correlated. We show that this difference is crucial, because it leads to a different optimal
policy for the last-mile supply chain system: The system operator always has incentive to give
priority to those parcels with higher values.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we conduct a literature review. In Section
3, we describe in detail the pricing and service priorities of LMTS and discuss the associated
fairness guarantees. In Section 4, we analyze LMTS fluid models on pricing and service priorities
to obtain theoretical results regarding the service provider’s profit and social welfare for LMTS
with different fairness concerns. In Section 5, we present a set of numerical experiments using real
public transport data from Singapore and discuss the results and insights. Section 6 contains a
summary and concluding remarks.
2. Literature Review
Many recent papers have addressed various models and case studies of the passenger LMTS. Several
case studies analyze LMTS in different contexts, including Liu et al. [2012]’s study of a bicycle-
sharing program for a passenger LMTS in Beijing. Some studies have also examined the design
and operation of a passenger LMTS. Wang and Odoni [2014] address the planning side by fo-
cusing on passenger LMTS from a stochastic and planning perspective and provide closed-form
approximations for the performance of an LMTS as a function of the system’s fundamental design
parameters. Wang [2017] focuses on passenger LMTS from an operational perspective and provides
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efficient strategies for passenger assignment, vehicle routing and scheduling of operations based on a
set of last-mile demand information. Personal rapid transit (PRT) and Demand Responsive Transit
(DRT), which refer to a variety of transportation systems with characteristics that are similar, in
some ways, to LMTS, have also attracted significant attention in recent years, such as Anderson
[1998], Horn [2002], Quadrifoglio et al. [2008], Lees-Miller et al. [2009], Berger et al. [2011], and
Mueller and Sgouridis [2011].
Another large body of literature has generated various models related to the last-mile supply
chain. Many studies have addressed this, given the burgeoning role of e-commerce. These studies
focus more on last-mile supply chain concept discussions and simulations (e.g., Punakivi et al.
[2001]); general fulfillment strategies (e.g., Lee and Whang [2001]); delivery options effects (e.g.,
Esper et al. [2003]); demand characteristics effects (e.g., Boyer et al. [2009]); and specific applica-
tion contexts, such as Balcik et al. [2008]’s study of last-mile distribution geared to the needs of
humanitarian relief chains.
The pricing problem of urban transportation systems has also been studied for many years in
diverse contexts. The relevant literature mainly focuses on dynamic pricing and congestion pricing
in transportation networks. The most influential papers in this area include Yang and Bell [1997],
Yang and Huang [1998], Lindsney and Verhoef [2001], Mookherjee and Friesz [2008], Lu et al.
[2008], Lou et al. [2010], de Palma and Lindsey [2011], Wu et al. [2011], Do Chung et al. [2012],
and Chen and Wang [2018]. None of these papers address the pricing and service priority problem
with fairness concerns in the context of an on-demand shared last-mile transportation system.
In recent years, a growing operations management literature has studied shared transportation
problems. Benjaafar et al. [2015] study a system in which every individual endogenizes her decision
on whether to own a car. A car owner uses her car to give rides to others who do not own cars,
and an individual who does not own a car requests a riding service offered by a car owner when
she needs a ride. This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes, including ownership and
usage levels, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Benjaafar et al. [2017] allow every individual
to have an outside option of not participating in the ride-sharing business, and find that the ratio
of car ownership to usage costs is a crucial determinant that decides how the ride-sharing system
is organized. Banerjee et al. [2015] study optimal pricing strategies for a ride-sharing platform,
and show that the optimal static pricing policy outperforms any dynamic pricing policy when
the market environment is stable and the market size is large. Cachon et al. [2017] complement
this paper by showing that drivers and riders can benefit from dynamic pricing under certain
conditions. Bai et al. [2017] study a static pricing problem using queuing systems in which a
platform creates a market for service in which the arrivals of consumers and servers are endogenously
determined based on decisions to seek and provide service, respectively. Chen and Hu [2017]
study a ride-sharing system with forward-looking riders and drivers. The authors identify the
conditions under which static pricing is optimal and the conditions under which dynamic pricing
is optimal. Bimpikis et al. [2016] study spatial price discrimination in the context of a ride-sharing
platform that serves a network of locations, and identify the impact of the demand pattern on the
platform’s prices, profits, and induced consumer surplus. Afèche et al. [2018] study a ride-hailing
system in which the demand has significant spatial imbalance and drivers strategically decide when
and where to reposition themselves when not serving riders. The authors explore the impact
of the demand-side admission control model and the supply-side repositioning control model on
each party’s performance. Braverman et al. [2016] study an empty-car routing problem in a ride-
hailing system. The authors show that the optimal policy in a fluid-based optimization problem
is asymptotic optimal in the primary stochastic system. Feng et al. [2017] study two ride-hailing
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systems: the emerging on-demand ride-hailing system operated by Uber, etc., and the traditional
taxi street-hailing system. The authors identify the impact of system parameters on the relative
efficiencies of these two ride-hailing systems. Séjourné et al. [2017] study a ride-sharing system that
consists of multiple competing platforms and quantify the welfare loss that arises from platform
fragmentation. Cohen and Zhang [2017] study a ride-sharing system that consists of multiple
platforms that both compete and cooperate, referred to as “coopetition.” They identify conditions
under which coopetition is beneficial for all platforms. They show the existence of a profit-sharing
contract that benefits every party in the system—riders, drivers, and platforms. Banerjee et al.
[2016] formulate a ride-sharing platform’s multi-location matching maximization problem as a high-
dimensional and non-convex steady-state Markovian model. The authors propose a heuristic policy
that is proven to be nearly optimal when the average number of vehicles per station is large. Ozkan
and Ward [2017] establish the asymptotic optimality of an LP-based matching policy in a large
market regime in which drivers are fully utilized. He et al. [2017] study an electric vehicle sharing
system’s planning problems. In addition to the papers above that study car-sharing problems, the
following papers study bicycle-sharing problems: Shu et al. [2013], O’Mahony and Shmoys [2015],
Kabra et al. [2016], and Freund et al. [2017].
3. Model
Consider a decision maker who plans to implement an LMTS at a metro station. The LMTS
offers the service of using vehicles to transport passengers who get off this station to their final
destinations. Trains dynamically arrive to the station over time. The time between two consecutive
arriving trains is a constant, denoted by h.
Passengers who take the trains are of two types: a regular type (indexed as type-1) and a
special type (indexed as type-2). The regular-type passenger refers to those who are not eligible
to buy discounted train tickets. The special-type passengers refer to those who are eligible to buy
discounted train tickets, such as seniors, disabled people, children, and students (see, e.g., the public
transportation system in Massachusetts, U.S., operated by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA), and the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system in Singapore).
Upon each train’s arrival, each passenger type i ∈ {1, 2} has Ni passengers discharged from
the train. We assume that for each passenger type i ∈ {1, 2}, Ni is independent and identically
distributed for all trains that arrive at the station at different times. We denote by µi and σ2i the
mean and the variance of Ni, respectively. Appendix A Table 4 provides a glossary of notation.
Last-mile transportation system
The LMTS operator prepares m vehicles at the metro station to deliver last-mile transportation
service (LMTS)1. Each vehicle incurs operating cost c per unit of time. The operating cost includes
the cost of energy (electricity or gasoline) used to power a vehicle and the payment to a driver who
drives a vehicle.
We notice that many car-sharing companies are using two-seated vehicles for car-sharing ser-
vices. For instance, Car2go uses Smart Fortwo vehicles in a variety of countries, such as Canada,
Germany, and the U.S.2 Togo uses Smart Fortwo vehicles for car-sharing service in a variety of cities
1We abuse our notation to use “LMTS” to refer to both “Last-Mile Transportation System” and “Last-Mile
Transportation Service.”
2https://www.car2go.com/US/en/#152743
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in China.3 General Motors and Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) have launched a program
that uses Chevrolet EN-V 2.0 vehicles for car-sharing service at SJTU’s Minhang campus.4 These
two-seated vehicles can easily fit in almost any parking spot and maneuver under complex traffic
conditions. Note that a two-seated vehicle has one seat reserved for the driver, and each vehicle
can take only one passenger to her destination in one ride. Therefore, in this paper, we assume
that the LMTS operator chooses to use such two-seated vehicles with capacity 1, i.e., each vehicle
takes only one passenger in a ride.
We assume that last-miles service times for passengers are independent and identically dis-
tributed. We denote by µS and σ2S the mean and variance of the last-mile service time, respec-
tively. The LMTS operator charges pi for each type-i passenger who uses the LMTS. Passengers
who decide to use the LMTS enter and wait in a queue.
Passenger utility functions
Each passenger is endowed with a valuation (willingness-to-pay) of the LMTS. For each passenger
type i ∈ {1, 2}, passenger valuations are heterogeneous with a c.d.f. Fi(·) and a p.d.f. fi(·),
supported on [0, v¯i]. We denote F¯i(·) , 1−Fi(·). We make the following assumptions on passenger
valuation distribution functions.
Assumption 1.
1. The hazard rate function fi(v)
F¯i(v)
5 is non-decreasing in v ∈ [0, v¯i] for i ∈ {1, 2}.
2. f1(v)
F¯1(v)
> f2(v)
F¯2(v)
for v ∈ [0, v¯1].
Part 1 of this assumption is quite typical in a vast number of pricing studies (see, e.g., Özer
and Wei [2006], Golrezaei et al. [2017], and Chen and Shi [2017]). Part 2 requires that special-
type passengers are more likely to value LMTS more than regular-type passengers. Special-type
passengers, such as seniors and children, typically have more difficulty walking from a metro station
to their destination than regular-type passengers, such as adults. Therefore, the LMTS is more
necessary and valuable for special-type passengers than for regular-type passengers.
We denote by wi a type-i passenger’s expected waiting time for the LMTS. If a type-i passenger
with valuation v uses the LMTS, then she garners the expected utility (measured in dollars)
v − pi − αiwi,
where αi ≥ 0 is type-i passenger’s disutility from waiting for the LMTS for one unit of time. We
make the following assumption on αi.
Assumption 2. α1 > α2.
Assumption 2 requires that regular-type passengers are more impatient while waiting for LMTS
than special-type passengers. The validity of this assumption is as follows. Regular-type passengers,
which includes many adults who regularly commute between their home and workplace, typically
have more time pressure than special-type passengers, such as retired seniors. In the presence of
3https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/beijing-togo-technology-co-ltd#/entity
4http://media.gm.com/media/cn/en/gm/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/cn/en/2015/may/
0527_shanghaijiaotong.html
5We adopt a convention that fi(v)
F¯i(v)
=∞ if v ≥ v¯i.
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work stress, an adult would benefit from having more time to either work or take a rest from work
if she saved some time in a trip.
A passenger uses LMTS if and only if doing so enables her to derive a non-negative utility.
Therefore, the probability that a type-i passenger uses the LMTS is F¯i (pi + αiwi).
It is worth noting that Assumptions 1 and 2 require that passenger valuation and the waiting
disutility rate on the LMTS are negatively correlated. This feature is completely opposite to the
parcel delivery system in the last-mile supply chain, in which a customer’s product valuation and
her disutility rate of waiting for delivery are positively correlated (see, e.g., Nazerzadeh and Rand-
hawa [2015] and Afèche and Pavlin [2016]). As we will see in Section 4, this distinction is crucial,
because it leads to different optimal service priority policies for the passenger LMTS and the parcel
delivery system in the last-mile supply chain.
Fairness guarantees
Special-type passengers, such as seniors, disabled people, children, and students, are typically
vulnerable groups in a society. Therefore, to protect these people, the LMTS operator should
offer them more appealing services with fairness concerns. We define the following two fairness
guarantees.
1. Fairness guarantee on price discount. The fare for special-type passengers is guaranteed
to be no higher than a fraction of the fare for regular-type passengers, i.e., p2 ≤ (1− θ) p1 for
a given minimum discount rate θ ∈ [0, 1].
2. Fairness guarantee on (weak) service priority. For passengers who are discharged from
the same train and request LMTS, either all passengers are served in a mixed way, or special-
type passengers have priority to be served prior to regular-type passengers—i.e., serving all
regular-type passengers before starting to serve all special-type passengers is not allowed.
The validity of the fairness guarantee on price discount is as follows. Unlike regular-type
passengers who are typically employed adults, special-type passengers typically have low or no
income. It is necessary to restrict the fare for these people to not exceed a certain fraction of
the fare for regular-type passengers. This fairness guarantee on price discount is consistent with
the practice of many public transportation systems around the world. For instance, in the MBTA
system in Massachusetts, U.S.6, and Singapore’s MRT system7, the fare for seniors is no more than
50% of the fare for regular-type passengers who take the same trip.
The validity of the fairness guarantee on service priority is as follows. Last-mile service is much
more important for special-type passengers, who may be more vulnerable while waiting for LMTS
than regular-type passengers. A lack of last-mile service will prevent more special-type passengers
from using public transport. Therefore, one way to protect these people is to offer them prioritized
LMTS service.
We then define an LMTS operating mode
o = (θˆ, priority)
that is subject to the aforementioned two fairness guarantees. The first parameter θˆ ∈ [θ, 1] specifies
the exact price discount for special-type passengers that is subject to the first fairness guarantee
6http://www.mbta.com/fares_and_passes/
7https://www.smrt.com.sg/Journey-with-Us/Fares-Claims
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condition. We have p2 =
(
1− θˆ
)
p1. The second parameter priority ∈ {0, 2} specifies the service-
priority rule, which is subject to the second fairness guarantee condition. The index “0” denotes
the mode in which no service priority is offered to special-type passengers—i.e., both types of pas-
sengers are served in a mixed way. The index “2” denotes the mode in which service priority is
offered to special-type (type-2) passengers.
The LMTS operator’s problem
Considering the two fairness guarantees, the LMTS operator determines the operating mode o =
(θˆ, priority) ∈ [θ, 1] × {0, 2}, the price for regular-type passengers p1 ∈ R+, and the number of
vehicles in the LMTS, m ∈ N. We study the LMTS operator’s two objectives: maximizing profit
and maximizing social welfare.
If the LMTS is operated by a commercial company that is profit driven, then it solves the
following optimization problem that maximizes her expected profit per unit of time:
max
o,p1,m
1
h
2∑
i=1
piµiF¯i (pi + αiwi (o, p1,m))−mc (1)
s.t. µS
∑2
i=1 µiF¯i (pi + αiwi (o, p1,m))
hm
< 1.
In this optimization problem, wi (o, p1,m) denotes type-i passenger’s expected waiting time for
last-mile service under the LMTS operator’s decision (o, p1,m). In the objective function, the first
term denotes the revenue derived from offering the LMTS and the second term denotes the LMTS
operating cost. The constraint prevents the LMTS from being overutilized.
If the LMTS is operated by a government agency that aims to use LMTS to improve the public
transportation system for the entire society, then it aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the
summation of the LMTS operator’s profit and consumer surplus derived from enjoying the LMTS.
The consumer surplus per unit of time is given by
1
h
2∑
i=1
µi
∫ ∞
v=αiwi(o,p1,m)+pi
(v − αiwi (o, p1,m)− pi) fi (v) dv = 1
h
2∑
i=1
µi
∫ ∞
v=αiwi(o,p1,m)+pi
F¯i (v) dv.
Therefore, the LMTS operator solves the following optimization problem that maximizes its
expected social welfare per unit of time:
max
o,p1,m
1
h
2∑
i=1
piµiF¯i (pi + αiwi (o, p1,m))−mc+ 1
h
2∑
i=1
µi
∫ ∞
v=pi+αiwi(o,p1,m)
F¯i (v) dv (2)
s.t. µS
∑2
i=1 µiF¯i (pi + αiwi (o, p1,m))
hm
< 1.
Recall that social welfare is defined as the summation of the LMTS operator’s profit and con-
sumer surplus. In the objective function of this optimization problem, the sum of the first two
terms denotes the profit from running the LMTS and the third term denotes the consumer surplus.
To solve optimization problems (1) and (2), we need to compute wi (o, p1,m) for every given
decision (o, p1,m). According to Wang and Odoni [2014]’s Equation (10), type-i passenger’s ex-
pected waiting time, wi (o, p1,m), is a function of the distribution of each type-i passenger’s arrival,
the probability that a type-i passenger uses the LMTS, F¯i (pi + αiwi (o, p1,m)), the distribution
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of last-mile service time, and the number of operating vehicles, m. We can obtain wi (o, p1,m) by
solving this complicated equation.
4. Fluid Analysis
We need to understand which operating mode maximizes the LMTS’s profit or social welfare in the
presence of the fairness guarantees on price discount and service priority for special-type passengers.
To be precise, given the LMTS operator’s objective of maximizing profit or social welfare, we
must determine the following: (1) whether the LMTS operator offers special-type passengers the
minimum or a deeper price discount and (2) whether the LMTS operator serves both types of
passengers in a mixed way or gives service priority to special-type passengers.
Answering these questions requires that we solve optimization problems (1) and (2). However,
we face the following challenges: (1) Passengers who are discharged from a train and use the LMTS
follow a batch-arrival process; (2) the number of each type of passengers discharged from a train is a
random variable; (3) each passenger’s willingness-to-pay for the LMTS is a random variable; and (4)
each passenger’s service time in the LMTS is a random variable. In the presence of these challenges,
even for the LMTS operator’s given decision (o, p1,m), it is impossible to precisely compute each
type-i passenger’s expected waiting time wi (o, p1,m). The result in Wang and Odoni [2014] is an
approximation of waiting time for LMTS serving single-type passengers, and still has a complex
form. As a result, optimization problems (1) and (2) are theoretically intractable.
Therefore, in order to gain insights into the two questions raised above and avoid the difficulties
of analyzing these two optimization problems, we analyze their fluid deterministic counterparts that
eliminate all uncertainties in these problems. In the fluid model, we assume that (1) passengers
and vehicles are infinitesimal; (2) the fraction of type-i passengers whose willingness-to-pay for
LMTS is more than v is F¯i(v); (3) the number of type-i passengers discharged from a train is a
constant, µi; and (4) every passenger’s service time in the LMTS is a constant, µS . Analyzing the
fluid counterpart to gain insights into the real shared transportation system is a typical approach
adopted by a large number of studies (see, e.g., Afèche et al. [2018], Benjaafar et al. [2015], Bimpikis
et al. [2016], and Benjaafar et al. [2017]).
It is worth highlighting the distinction between our fluid model for the LMTS and fluid models
for many other queueing systems, such as the M/M/c model. In our fluid model, passengers who
use the LMTS follow a batch-arrival process. Hence, although the deterministic model removes
all uncertainties, a passenger discharged from a train may still have to wait for last-mile service.
Therefore, when we analyze the deterministic system, we must still take into account passenger
waiting times. By contrast, the M/M/c model does not have batch arrivals, and therefore its fluid
counterpart does not have the waiting time.
In our fluid model, because the passenger batch-arrival process causes waiting, our subsequent
analysis will frequently compute a passenger’s expected waiting time for the LMTS. The following
result is very useful for our subsequent analysis. Consider a passenger for whom the number of
passengers ahead of her who are also waiting for LMTS is uniformly distributed between [nL, nH ].
Suppose the number of vehicles for the LMTS is m. Then, this passenger’s expected waiting time,
wf (nL, nH ,m), is given by
wf (nL, nH ,m) = 2µSEn
[
b n
m
c
]
. (3)
The expectation En[·] is with respect to n, which is uniformly distributed between [nL, nH ]. The
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factor 2 on the R.H.S. captures both how long it takes for a vehicle to deliver a passenger to her
final destination and how long it takes the vehicle to return to the metro station after dropping off
the passenger.
4.1. The LMTS Designer’s Optimal Operating Modes
In this subsection, we investigate the LMTS operator’s optimal operating mode in the fluid setting,
with both profit and social welfare maximization objectives. To understand why the price discount
constraint and the service priority constraint introduced in Section 3 are needed to guarantee
fairness, we conduct the analysis on an expanded operating mode set that allows the price discount
for special-type passengers, θˆ, to be smaller than θ and allows regular-type (type-1) passengers to
be served prior to special-type (type-2) passengers (this service priority rule is indexed as “1”).
We begin by analyzing the LMTS operator’s profit maximization problem. Our analysis consists
of two steps. First, we compute the LMTS operator’s optimal profit per unit of time in the fluid
model under a given operating mode o ∈ [0, 1]× {0, 1, 2}, J¯p(o).8 Second, we compute the LMTS
operator’s optimal operating mode.
We notice that computing the LMTS operator’s optimal profit under different service priority
rules requires that we solve different types of optimization problems. We write down the LMTS
operator’s profit maximization problem under each service priority rule.
In an operating mode that serves both types of passengers in a mixed way, i.e., o =
(
θˆ, 0
)
with
θˆ ∈ [0, 1], the LMTS operator solves the following optimization problem:
max
p1,m
1
h
2∑
i=1
piµiqi −mc (4)
s.t. qi = F¯i (pi + αiwi) , i ∈ {1, 2}
w1 = w2 = wf (0, µ1q1 + µ2q2,m)
p2 =
(
1− θˆ
)
p1
w1 = w2 ≤ h
In this optimization problem, notation qi denotes the fraction of type-i passengers who use
LMTS. The second constraint captures the service rule by which the LMTS operator serves two
types of passengers in a mixed way. The fourth constraint prevents the system from being overuti-
lized.
In an operating mode that gives service priority to regular-type passengers, i.e., o =
(
θˆ, 1
)
with
θˆ ∈ [0, 1], the LMTS operator solves the following optimization problem:
max
p1,m
1
h
2∑
i=1
piµiqi −mc (5)
s.t. qi = F¯i (pi + αiwi) , i ∈ {1, 2}
w1 = wf (0, µ1q1,m)
w2 = wf (µ1q1, µ1q1 + µ2q2,m)
8Under a given operating mode o, the LMTS operator optimizes over the price for regular-type passengers, p1,
and the number of vehicles for the LMTS, m.
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p2 =
(
1− θˆ
)
p1
w2 ≤ h
In this optimization problem, notation qi denotes the fraction of type-i passengers who use
LMTS. The second and the third constraints capture the service rule by which the LMTS operator
gives service priority to regular-type passengers. The fifth constraint prevents the system from
being overutilized.
In an operating mode that gives service priority to special-type passengers, i.e., o =
(
θˆ, 2
)
with
θˆ ∈ [0, 1], the LMTS operator solves the following optimization problem:
max
p1,m
1
h
2∑
i=1
piµiqi −mc (6)
s.t. qi = F¯i (pi + αiwi) , i ∈ {1, 2}
w2 = wf (0, µ2q2,m)
w1 = wf (µ2q2, µ1q1 + µ2q2,m)
p2 =
(
1− θˆ
)
p1
w1 ≤ h
In this optimization problem, notation qi denotes the fraction of type-i passengers who use
LMTS. The second and the third constraints capture the service rule by which the LMTS operator
gives service priority to special-type passengers. The fifth constraint prevents the system from
being overutilized.
Next, we investigate the impact of the two dimensions of an operating mode—price discount
and service priority—on the LMTS’s optimal profit. All proofs for the main results in this section
are deferred to Appendix B.
Theorem 1.
1.
J¯p (θ, priority) ≥ J¯p (θ′, priority) , ∀ 0 ≤ θ < θ′ ≤ 1, ∀ priority ∈ {0, 1, 2} .
2.
J¯p (θ, 2) ≤ J¯p (θ, 0) ≤ J¯p (θ, 1) , ∀ θ ∈ [0, 1] .
Part 1 shows that the LMTS operator is more profitable if it offers a smaller price discount
to special-type passengers. Because special-type passengers value LMTS more than regular-type
passengers, the LMTS operator has incentive to charge special-type passengers a higher price to
extract their willingness-to-pay as much as possible. Therefore, as a fairness concern, to protect
special-type passengers from paying too much to use LMTS, it is necessary to impose a minimum
price discount for them.
Part 2 shows that the LMTS operator is more profitable if it serves regular-type passengers prior
to serving special-type passengers. Because regular-type passengers are more time sensitive than
special-type passengers, the LMTS operator has incentive to serve them first so that they will avoid
incurring too high waiting disutility, and thus stop using LMTS. By contrast, the LMTS operator
has incentive to delay service for special-type passengers, whose utilities do not lose too much from
waiting. Therefore, as a fairness concern, to protect special-type passengers from waiting too long
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for LMTS, it is necessary to impose a service priority restriction that guarantees that special-type
passengers will be served no later than regular-type passengers.
Theorem 1 immediately implies that in the presence of the minimum-price-discount fairness
constraint and the service-priority fairness constraint, the operating mode that maximizes the
LMTS operator’s profit is to offer special-type passengers the minimum price discount and serve
both types of passengers in a mixed way:
o¯p = argmax
o∈[θ,1]×{0,2}
J¯p(o)
= (θ, 0) .
Next, we analyze the LMTS operator’s social welfare maximization problem. Our analysis
follows the same two steps above that are used to analyze the LMTS operator’s profit maximization
problem.
For each operating mode o ∈ [0, 1] × {0, 1, 2}, the LMTS operator’s optimal social welfare,
J¯SW (o), is the optimal value of an optimization problem that is only distinguished from the profit
maximization problem for the LMTS operator’s optimal profit J¯p(o) with the following social
welfare objective function:
1
h
2∑
i=1
piµiqi −mc+ 1
h
2∑
i=1
µi
∫ ∞
v=F¯−1i (qi)
F¯i (v) dv.
Next, we investigate the impact of the two dimensions of an operating mode—price discount
and service priority—on the LMTS’s optimal social welfare.
Theorem 2.
1.
J¯SW (θ, priority) ≥ J¯SW (θ′, priority) , ∀ 0 ≤ θ < θ′ ≤ 1, ∀ priority ∈ {0, 1, 2} .
2.
J¯SW (θ, 2) ≤ J¯SW (θ, 0) ≤ J¯SW (θ, 1) , ∀ θ ∈ [0, 1] .
The properties above with the social welfare maximization objective are the same as the corre-
sponding properties with the profit maximization objective. Therefore, even with the social welfare
maximization objective, the LMTS operator still has incentive to charge special-type passengers
a higher price as much as possible, and serve them after regular-type passengers. Therefore, to
protect special-type passengers from paying too much to use LMTS, it is necessary to enforce a
minimum price discount for them. To protect special-type passengers from waiting too long to
use LMTS, it is necessary to enforce a service priority restriction that guarantees that special-type
passengers will be served no later than regular-type passengers.
Theorem 2 immediately implies that the optimal operating mode that maximizes the LMTS’s
social welfare is the same as the optimal operating mode that maximizes the LMTS’s profit: The
LMTS operator offers special-type passengers the minimum price discount and serves both types
of passengers in a mixed way:
o¯SW = argmax
o∈[θ,1]×{0,2}
J¯SW (o)
= (θ, 0) .
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4.2. The Optimal Operating Mode in Parcel Delivery Systems
As described in Sections 1 and 3, a key feature of the passenger LMTS is that a passenger’s valuation
of LMTS and her disutility rate of waiting for LMTS are negatively correlated (see Assumptions 1
and 2). By contrast, a parcel delivery system in the last-mile supply chain has an opposite feature,
by which a customer’s valuation on a parcel and her disutility rate from waiting for the parcel’s
delivery are positively correlated. In this subsection, we explore the impact of this distinction on
a parcel delivery system’s optimal operating mode. Because most parcel delivery companies are
profit driven, we focus on the profit maximization objective.
Analogous to our model for the passenger LMTS, we assume that there are two types of parcels
to be delivered: the regular type (indexed as type-1) and the special type (indexed as type-2). We
still impose Assumption 1 in the parcel delivery model, i.e., regular-type parcels are statistically less
valuable than special-type parcels. In a parcel delivery system, because a customer whose parcel
is more valuable is normally more sensitive to parcel delivery time, we must replace Assumption 2
with the following opposite assumption:
Assumption 3. α1 < α2.
We study the following three types of operating modes that correspond to different delivery
(service) priorities for regular-type and special-type parcels.
1. Mode (0): no delivery priority for any type of parcel. Upon each batch arrival, both
types of parcels are delivered in a random order (in a mixed way).
2. Mode (1): regular-type parcels enjoy delivery priority. Upon each batch arrival,
regular-type parcels are delivered prior to special-type parcels.
3. Mode (2): special-type (high value) parcels enjoy delivery priority. Upon each
batch arrival, special-type parcels are delivered prior to regular-type parcels.
Analogous to our analysis of the passenger LMTS in Section 4.1, we study the parcel delivery
problem in a fluid deterministic setting. For each operating mode o ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the parcel delivery
system’s optimal profit, g(o), is the optimal value of an optimization problem that is only distin-
guished from the profit maximization problem for the passenger LMTS operator’s optimal profit
J¯p(o) by removing the price constraints between p1 and p2.
Next, we investigate the impact of the service priority rule on the parcel delivery system’s
optimal profit.
Theorem 3.
g (2) > g (0) > g (1) .
Theorem 3 immediately implies that the operating mode that maximizes a parcel delivery
system’s profit is to give priority to deliver special-type parcels, which typically carry higher values:
argmax
o∈{0,1,2}
g(o) = 2.
Theorems 1 and 3 reveal the fundamental difference between a passenger LMTS and a parcel
delivery system in the last-mile supply chain. In a passenger LMTS, because special-type passengers
have higher valuations of LMTS but lower waiting disutility rates than regular-type passengers, the
LMTS operator has no incentive to provide them prioritized service. Therefore, a fairness constraint
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on the service priority must be enforced to protect them from being vulnerable while waiting a long
time for LMTS. By contrast, in a parcel delivery system, because customers expecting special-type
parcels with higher valuations are more time sensitive regarding delivery than those who expect to
get regular-type parcels with lower valuations, the parcel delivery system has incentive to deliver
special-type parcels with priority without requiring any external force. In other words, the fairness
guarantee on service priority for passenger LMTS is critical; special-type passengers who need the
service most may receive delayed service if we do not enforce the fairness guarantee on service
priority.
5. Experiments and Discussion
In this section, we implement diverse operating modes o = [0, 1]× {0, 2} in passenger LMTS with
the objectives of maximizing profit and maximizing social welfare described in Sections 3 and 4. We
use real public transport data from Singapore for LMTS at a sample set of metro stations. We first
introduce the background and settings of the numerical experiments, then present the results of
different modes of price discounts and service priorities for LMTS. Finally, we compare the pricing
modes and discuss related managerial insights.
5.1. Experimental Background and Settings
We begin our numerical exploration of the proposed pricing modes with a brief case study based
on real public transport data from Singapore. The case study illustrates how the proposed pricing
modes are applied in practice.
Singapore is a 719.7 km2 city-state9 with 5.61 million people10. The country is ranked third
worldwide (following Macau and Monaco) in terms of population density11. To control private car
ownership to avoid serious traffic congestion and air pollution, the price of a private vehicle license
plate (a.k.a. Certificate of Entitlement, valid for 10 years) is based on bidding. The bidding result
is very high—e.g., from S$45,578 to S$75,621 for a single vehicle license plate in 2015 and 201612.
Public transport, including buses and Mass Rapid Transit (MRT), is the leading transportation
service mode in Singapore. It plays a significant role and has very high utilization. According to
the Singapore Land Transport Authority, in 2014, average daily ridership was 3.7 million and 2.7
million passenger trips for buses and the MRT, respectively13. Therefore, how to render public
transport more efficient and attractive is a highly important challenge. Recently, LMTS has been
proposed as a solution.
LMTS is supposed to serve public transport users, including working adults, seniors, children,
students, and the disabled. Both government agencies and commercial transport service providers
are exploring the establishment of LMTS, in which seniors, children, students, and the disabled
(i.e., special-type passengers) should enjoy price discounts and service priority. On one hand,
Singapore has a rapidly aging population. According to Ng (2015), the number of residents 65
and older doubled from 220,000 in 2000 to 440,000 in 2015, and is expected to rise to 900,000 by
9https://data.gov.sg/dataset/total-land-area-of-singapore
10https://www.nptd.gov.sg/Portals/0/Homepage/Highlights/population-in-brief-2016.pdf
11https://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=21000
12https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/dam/ltaweb/coRP/PublicationsResearch/files/FactsandFigures/
COE_Result_2015_2016.pdf
13https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/dam/ltaweb/coRP/PublicationsResearch/files/FactsandFigures/
Statistics in Brief 2015 FINAL.pdf
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203014. On the other hand, the percentage of dual-career couples is high, and public transport
is also critical for children/students who commute daily between home and school. According to
the Singapore Department of Statistics, the percentage of dual-career couples is more than 75%
for young couples when the husband is under 3515. LMTS will increase accessibility and safety
for seniors and children/students who use buses and the MRT. Special-type passengers, if possible,
should enjoy higher priority because LMTS is more valuable to them.
The pioneering use of autonomous vehicles in Singapore also boosts the fast deployment of
LMTS. The world’s first autonomous public transport vehicles began picking up passengers in Sin-
gapore in August 201616, and offered rides for public transport users in Singapore a few weeks before
Uber’s driverless ride-hailing service was launched in Pittsburgh. A fleet of small autonomous cars
now operate in a 2.5 square mile business and residential district and provide on-demand trans-
portation service. According to a report by the Singapore Land Transport Authority, “autonomous
vehicles could serve as new mobility modes to offer customized and demand-responsive transport
services of dynamic routes within towns. A network of shared vehicles within a town could ad-
dress ‘first-mile, last-mile’ issues.” In general, Singapore is a good place to implement LMTS, and
has already undertaken the effort. In this section, we explore pricing optimization for LMTS that
serves a sample set of public transport stations (we choose the MRT stations as examples). We use
real public transport demand data—bus and MRT passengers’ transaction data stored in metro
cards—to explore pricing optimization problems and compare different pricing and service priority
modes.
We select three sample MRT stations with representative demand patterns. For each sample
station, the headway between metro trains (h in the model) can be easily obtained from public
train schedules. If we consider adults as regular-type (type-1) passengers, and seniors and chil-
dren/students as special-type (type-2) passengers, we can obtain the corresponding mean (µi) and
variance (σ2i ) of each passenger type discharged from trains using metro card transaction data.
The ratio of regular-type passengers and special-type passengers can be obtained easily. Table 1
shows information for the selected sample MRT stations. Station S1 is a station with the fewest
special-type passengers; station S2 is a large station with heavy total demand and more special-type
passengers; and station S3 is a station with the most special-type passengers.
MRT Headway h Regular Passengers (per train) Special Passengers (per train) Ratio
Station (minute) µ1 σ1 µ2 σ2 (µ1/µ2)
S1 6 47.9 14.5 9.5 3.2 5.04
S2 6 143.6 41.3 40.3 10.9 3.56
S3 5 55.7 21.6 30.6 12.9 1.82
Table 1: Selected Sample MRT Stations.
In the numerical experiments, we assume that a regular-type passenger’s valuation of LMTS is
uniformly distributed between [0, v¯1], where v¯1 is in the range between S$0.5 and S$1.5. Therefore,
we have c.d.f. F1(v) = v/v¯1 and p.d.f. f1(v) = 1/v¯1 for v ∈ [0, v¯1]. Similarly, we assume that a
special-type passenger’s valuation of LMTS is uniformly distributed between [0, v¯2], where v¯2 is in
the range between S$1.0 and S$3.5 (i.e., the base price of an ordinary taxi in Singapore). Therefore,
14http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/singapore-feeling-impact-rapidly-ageing-population
15http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/publications/
publications_and_papers/GHS/ghs2015/findings.pdf
16https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-25/world-s-first-self-driving-taxis-debut-in-singapore
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we have c.d.f. F2(v) = v/v¯2 and p.d.f. f2(v) = 1/v¯2 for v ∈ [0, v¯2]. In each experiment, we choose
values of v¯1 and v¯2 with v¯1 ≤ v¯2. Values could be adjusted, given more accurate estimations from
market surveys.
As for αi, the monetary value of a passenger’s disutility from waiting for LMTS for a unit of
time, we use two references: (1) according to Trading Economics (2016), the average hourly wage
in Singapore is around S$20 in 2016, which transfers to S$1/3 per minute; and (2) according to
Gomez-Ibanez et al. (1999), for work trips in San Francisco, the monetary value per unit of waiting
time is around 195% of the user’s after-tax wages. Therefore, as an approximation, we estimate α1
around S$1/3 × 195% = S$0.65 per minute. In the numerical experiments, we assume α1 in the
range between S$0.2 and S$1.0 per minute, i.e., between S$12 and S$60 per hour for regular-type
passengers, and α2 in the range between S$0.1 and S$0.4 per minute, i.e., between S$6 and S$24
per hour, for special-type passengers, and α1 ≥ α2 in each experiment.
For the last-mile region of LMTS serving each MRT station, we need the mean and variance of
a last-mile trip’s travel time (i.e., last-mile service time) as inputs in the waiting time functions.
Assuming the last-mile region is a rectangular area with side length 1.0 km to 2.5 km and the
vehicles’ travel speed is around 30-40 km/hour with Manhattan travel distance, we can approximate
the service rate of passengers µS in the range between 0.2 and 0.5 per minute, i.e., between 12 and
30 per hour. The service rate could be adjusted, given a more specific geographic configuration
and detailed roadmap of the last-mile region.
For the vehicle operating cost c per unit of time, if the LMTS employs autonomous electric
vehicles, the electricity cost is around $0.04 per mile17, which translates to around S$0.02 per
minute under a normal vehicle speed of 30-40 km/hour. If vehicles are not autonomous, the
monthly wage for drivers is around S$2, 500 in Singapore18, which translates to around S$0.20 per
minute for a normal work shift. Therefore, as an approximation, we can assume that the operating
cost c is in the range between S$0.02 and S$0.25 per minute, i.e., between S$1.2 and S$15 per hour.
Normally, public transport services offer a certain discount for special-type passengers. If we
take the price for working adults as the benchmark price (i.e., p1 for regular-type passengers), the
current discount for the MRT and bus service in Singapore is between 30% and 50% for senior
citizens and children/students (i.e., special-type passengers). In the numerical experiments, we set
the price discount parameter θ between 0.0 and 0.9, which corresponds to discount rates between
0% and 90%.
For each selected sample station, we run the pricing optimization problems with the objectives
of maximizing profit and maximizing social welfare in diverse operating modes. In the numerical
experiments, instead of the waiting time approximation functions in the fluid analysis, we use the
complex but more accurate waiting time functions in the stochastic system of Wang and Odoni
[2014].
5.2. Results of Price and Service Priority
Table 2 presents the following results for station S1 under the profit maximization objective: the
fare and the number of hourly served passengers for each type, optimal profit, and the achieved
social welfare. As shown in the table, in the presence of the profit maximization objective, as
discount rate θ increases, optimal profits Jp (θ, 0) and Jp (θ, 2) decrease, regardless of whether we
give service priority to special-type passengers. Given an equal discount rate θ, Jp (θ, 0) is never
17http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_charging_home.html
18https://www.sbstransit.com.sg/press/2016-06-01-01.aspx
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less than Jp (θ, 2). This means that the LMTS operator is more profitable if it does not provide
service priority to special-type passengers. Such results are aligned with Theorem 1. We notice
that the social welfare JSW|p achieved under the profit maximization objective is not monotonic
in θ under both priority = 0 and priority = 2 modes. We also find that as the discount rate θ
increases to a certain threshold, i.e., when the discount rate (i.e., price priority) for special-type
passengers is large enough, only special-type passengers can obtain service in the end; specifically,
in priority = 2 mode—in which special-type passengers also enjoy service priority—this threshold
is even smaller, i.e., a smaller degree of discount rate would give special-type passengers exclusive
last-mile service.
Optimal Price Served Passengers Jp JSW|p
(ppi , $) (60µi ∗ F¯i (ppi ) /h, #/hr) ($/hr) ($/hr)
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
θ i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2
0.0 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.73 90 59 91 60 44 38 90 85
0.1 0.70 0.63 0.73 0.66 88 62 88 64 41 34 90 85
0.2 0.69 0.55 0.72 0.58 94 66 92 67 37 30 93 87
0.3 0.69 0.48 1.61 1.13 93 69 0 35 33 28 93 41
0.4 0.67 0.40 1.88 1.13 95 73 0 35 28 28 94 41
0.5 2.26 1.13 2.26 1.13 0 35 0 35 28 28 41 41
0.6 2.83 1.13 2.83 1.13 0 35 0 35 28 28 41 41
0.7 3.77 1.13 3.77 1.13 0 35 0 35 28 28 41 41
0.8 5.65 1.13 5.65 1.13 0 35 0 35 28 28 41 41
0.9 11.30 1.13 11.30 1.13 0 35 0 35 28 28 41 41
Table 2: Station S1 Profit, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20, c = 4.
Table 3 presents the following results for station S1 under the social welfare maximization ob-
jective: the fare and the number of hourly served passengers for each type, the achieved profit,
and optimal social welfare. As shown in the table, in the presence of the social welfare maximiza-
tion objective, as discount rate θ increases, optimal social welfare JSW (θ, 0) and JSW (θ, 2) will
again decrease, regardless of whether we give service priority to special-type passengers. Given
an equal discount rate θ, JSW (θ, 0) is never less than JSW (θ, 2). This means that LMTS gen-
erates more social welfare if it does not provide service priority to special-type passengers. Such
results are aligned with Theorem 2. In addition, in the computational study, we notice that the
profit Jp|SW achieved under the social welfare maximization objective is also monotonic in θ under
both priority = 0 and priority = 2 modes. Compared with the objective of maximizing profit,
the objective of maximizing social welfare always generates lower prices for both regular-type and
special-type passengers, and then both types of passengers can obtain last-mile service in the end.
Corresponding results for stations S2 and S3 are reported in Tables 5-8. The observations that
we draw from these tables are consistent with our observations above for station S1. Therefore, to
avoid redundancy, we present these tables in Appendix C.
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis
We also explore the results with a wide range of input parameters to capture diverse scenarios.
Specifically, we conduct a set of sensitivity analysis with the following changing parameters.
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Optimal Price Served Passengers Jp|SW J
SW
(pSWi , $) (60µi ∗ F¯i
(
pSWi
)
/h, #/hr) ($/hr) ($/hr)
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
θ i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2
0.0 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 229 73 222 76 1 -5 112 108
0.1 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.36 228 75 221 78 -2 -7 112 107
0.2 0.41 0.33 0.40 0.32 224 76 220 80 -2 -10 112 107
0.3 0.41 0.29 0.41 0.29 223 78 216 81 -5 -11 112 107
0.4 0.42 0.25 0.40 0.24 222 80 223 84 -8 -19 111 106
0.5 0.42 0.21 0.40 0.20 220 82 222 85 -10 -22 111 106
0.6 0.40 0.16 0.40 0.16 225 84 221 87 -17 -26 111 105
0.7 0.40 0.12 0.40 0.12 224 86 220 89 -20 -29 110 105
0.8 0.40 0.08 0.40 0.08 227 88 218 91 -26 -33 110 104
0.9 0.40 0.04 0.40 0.04 227 90 222 93 -30 -39 109 103
Table 3: Station S1 SW, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20, c = 4.
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Sensitivity analysis with service valuations v¯1 and v¯2
We explore the impact of passengers’ valuations on last-mile service. Specifically, we evaluate three
scenarios with low (v¯1 = 0.5, v¯2 = 1.0), median (v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0), and high (v¯1 = 2.0, v¯2 = 4.0)
service valuation for station S1 with the objectives of maximizing profit and maximizing social
welfare, respectively. Corresponding achieved profit Jp and social welfare JSW are summarized in
Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix C. We find that the results are robust and aligned with Theorems
1 and 2 in the scenarios with diverse service valuations. As service valuations v¯1 and v¯2 increase,
LMTS will generate more profit and social welfare in general. In addition, when the upper limits
of the service valuations decrease—because fewer or even no regular-type passengers are willing
to pay for the service—the profit and social welfare differences between giving service priority to
special-type passengers and not giving service priority to these passengers become smaller or even
disappear.
Sensitivity analysis with waiting time disutility rate α1 and α2
We explore the impact of passengers’ waiting disutility rate per unit of time on last-mile service.
Specifically, we evaluate three scenarios with low (α1 = 6, α2 = 3), median (α1 = 16, α2 = 8),
and high (α1 = 30, α2 = 15) waiting time disutility rate for station S1 with the objectives of
maximizing profit and maximizing social welfare, respectively. Corresponding achieved profit Jp
and social welfare JSW are summarized in Tables 11 and 12 in Appendix C. We find that the
results are robust and aligned with Theorems 1 and 2 in the scenarios with diverse waiting time
disutility rates. As waiting time disutility rates α1 and α2 increase, LMTS will generate less profit
and social welfare in general. In addition, when waiting time disutility rates increase—because
fewer or even no regular-type passengers are willing to wait for the service—the profit and social
welfare differences between giving service priority to special-type passengers and not giving service
priority to these passengers become smaller or even disappear.
Sensitivity analysis with vehicle operating cost of the service c
We explore the impact of vehicle per unit of time operating cost on last-mile service. Specifically,
we evaluate three scenarios with low (c = 4), median (c = 8), and high (c = 12) operating cost per
unit of time for station S1 with the objectives of maximizing profit and maximizing social welfare,
respectively. Corresponding achieved profit Jp and social welfare JSW are summarized in Tables
13 and 14 in Appendix C. We find that the results are robust and aligned with Theorems 1 and
2 in the scenarios with diverse vehicle operating cost. As operating cost c increases, LMTS will
generate less profit and social welfare in general. In addition, when operating cost increases, the
optimal number of vehicles that provide last-mile service decreases. This leads to a passenger’s
longer waiting times for last-mile service. As a result, fewer or even no regular-type passengers are
willing to wait for service. Therefore, when operating cost increases, the profit and social welfare
differences between giving service priority to special-type passengers and not giving service priority
to these passengers become smaller or even disappear.
5.4. Discussion and Insights
Based on both the theoretical analysis and numerical experiments, we obtain the following man-
agerial insights into the impact and importance of the two fairness guarantees—price discount and
service priority—with the objectives of both profit and social welfare maximization in the last-mile
transportation system.
1. The fairness guarantee on price discount, i.e., giving special-type passengers a discount
off the full price charged to regular-type passengers, is important. If there were no such fairness
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guarantee on price discount, the LMTS operator would end up with equal prices for both regular-
type and special-type passengers, regardless of whether its objective is maximizing profit (e.g.,
the LMTS provider is a profit-driven commercial company) or maximizing social welfare (e.g., the
LMTS provider is a non-profit company or government agency). We know that last-mile service is
much more valuable—and even irreplaceable—for special-type passengers. The absence of a fairness
guarantee on price discount would eliminate those who need the service most.
2. The fairness guarantee on service priority, i.e., giving special-type passengers priority to be
served prior to regular-type passengers, is also necessary. If there were no such fairness guarantee on
service priority, the LMTS operator would end up giving service priority to regular-type passengers,
regardless of whether its objective is maximizing profit or maximizing social welfare. The absence
of a fairness guarantee on service priority would delay service for the ones who need it most.
3. The two fairness guarantees essentially balance effectiveness and fairness. For the pricing
problem for a service that has special meaning for a certain group of customers, such as last-mile
transportation service for seniors/children with limited mobility, we should be cautious in making
pricing and service priority decisions; even an objective of maximizing social welfare would appear to
be hostile to these special-type customers/passengers. Therefore, enforcing the fairness guarantees
is critical, by which we are creating a fairer world in which priority is given to the people who need
the service most, with a small sacrifice of effectiveness.
6. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we study pricing and service priorities for the passenger last-mile transportation
system, which has recently emerged as an innovative on-demand shared transportation service.
Different from the parcel delivery system in the last-mile supply chain, in the passenger LMTS, a
special-type passenger who has a higher valuation of the service usually has a lower waiting time
disutility rate, i.e., the valuation of the service and the waiting time disutility rate are negatively
correlated. This distinction is crucial for pricing and service priority policies.
We consider two fairness guarantees—price discount and service priority—for special-type pas-
sengers, and propose models to analyze pricing and service priority policies. We prove that the
LMTS is more profitable if a smaller price discount and no service priority are given to special-type
passengers, and this is also the case for the social welfare maximization objective.
We implement the models in a set of numerical experiments using real public transport data
from Singapore. Based on both the theoretical analysis and numerical experiments, we find that
enforcing fairness guarantees in the LMTS is critical.
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A. Table of Notation
Parameters
h: inter-arrival time between consecutive arriving trains
Ni: random variable to indicate the number of type-i passengers discharged from each train
µi: mean of Ni
σ2i : variance of Ni
c: vehicle operating cost per unit of time
µS : mean of the last-mile service time
σ2S : variance of the last-mile service time
v: random variable to indicate a passenger’s valuation on last-mile service
v¯i: upper limit of a type-i passenger’s valuation on last-mile service
fi (·): p.d.f. of a type-i passenger’s valuation on last-mile service
Fi (·): c.d.f. of a type-i passenger’s valuation on last-mile service
F¯i (·) = 1− Fi (·)
wi: type-i passenger’s expected waiting time for last-mile service
αi: type-i passenger’s per unit of time disutility from waiting to use last-mile service
θ: minimum price discount for type-2 (special-type) passengers
Decision variables
o =
(
θˆ, priority
)
: operating mode
pi: fare for a type-i passenger who uses last-mile service
θˆ: price discount for type-2 passengers
priority = 0: two types of passengers are served in a mixed way
priority = i: type-i passengers are served with priority
m: number of vehicles that provide last-mile service
Outputs in the fluid model
J¯p (o): optimal profit under operating mode o
o¯p: operating mode that maximizes LMTS’s profit
J¯SW (o): optimal social welfare under operating mode o
o¯SW : operating mode that maximizes LMTS’s social welfare
g (o): optimal profit under operating mode o in a last-mile supply chain
Outputs in the stochastic model
ppi : fare for type-i passengers that maximizes LMTS’s expected profit
Jp: LMTS’s optimal expected profit
JSW|p : expected social welfare achieved under the decisions that maximize LMTS’s expected profit
pSWi : fare for type-i passengers that maximizes LMTS’s expected social welfare
JSW : LMTS’s optimal expected social welfare
Jp|SW : expected profit achieved under the decisions that maximize LMTS’s expected social welfare
Table 4: Summary of Major Notation.
24
B. Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Theorem 1
In this proof, we denote by J¯p≤ (o) the optimization problem (and also its optimal value) that
is only distinguished from the optimization problem for J¯p (o) by replacing the equality constraint
for the prices p1 and p2 with the following inequality constraint:
p2 ≤ (1− θ) p1.
We denote Ni = µiqi for i ∈ {1, 2} and N = N1 +N2. We denote pij = ∂pi∂qj for i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Next, we prove Part 1. It is sufficient to show that the price inequality constraint above is
binding for any optimization problem J¯p≤ (o) with o ∈ [0, 1]× {0, 1, 2}.
First, we consider o = (θ, 2) with θ ∈ [0, 1].
Define Ri (qi) , qiF¯−1i (qi). The optimization problem J¯
p
≤ (o) is equivalent to the following one:
max
q1,q2,m
1
h
(
µ1
(
R1 (q1)− α1wf (N2, N,m) q1
)
+ µ2
(
R2 (q2)− α2wf (0, N2,m) q2
))
−mc
s.t. p2 ≤ (1− θ) p1
wf (N2, N,m) ≤ h
In this optimization problem, we denote by ν the dual variable associated with the constraint
p2 ≤ (1− θ) p1 and η the dual variable associated with the constraint wf (N2, N,m) ≤ h.
In the proof of this part, a variable with a superscript “∗”, such as p∗1, denotes the optimal value
of this variable in the optimization problem J¯p≤ (o).
The optimal solution of this optimization problem satisfies the following KKT conditions:
µ1
h
(
R′1 (q∗1)− α1N∗1 ∂∂N∗wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)− α1w∗1
)
(7)
+ν∗ ((1− θ) p∗11 − p∗21)− η∗µ1 ∂∂N∗wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) = 0
and
µ2
h
(
R′2 (q∗2)− α2N∗2 ∂∂N∗2 w
f (0, N∗2 ,m∗)− α2w∗2
)
(8)
−µ2h α1N∗1
(
∂
∂N∗2
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + ∂∂N∗wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
)
+ν∗ ((1− θ) p∗12 − p∗22)− η∗µ2
(
∂
∂N∗2
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + ∂∂N∗wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
)
= 0.
The definition of Ri (qi) implies
R′i (qi) = pi + αiwi − F¯i(αiwi+pi)fi(αiwi+pi) .
We plug this equation into Equations (7) and (8). Suppose ν∗ = 0; then we have
p∗1 −
F¯1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
f1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
= α1N∗1
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + η∗h
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
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and
p∗2 −
F¯2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
f2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
= α2N∗2
∂
∂N∗2
wf (0, N∗2 ,m∗)
+α1N∗1
∂
∂N∗2
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + α1N∗1
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
+η∗h
(
∂
∂N∗2
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) +
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
)
≥ α1N∗1
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + η∗h
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) ,
where the inequality follows from the properties that
∂
∂nH
wf (nL, nH ,m) ≥ 0, ∂
∂nL
wf (nL, nH ,m) ≥ 0,
and the properties η∗ ≥ 0 and α2 ≥ 0.
Hence,
p∗1 −
F¯1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
f1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
≤ p∗2 −
F¯2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
f2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
.
However, we have
p∗1 −
F¯1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
f1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
> p∗1 −
F¯2 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
f2 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
≥ p∗2 −
F¯2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
f2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
,
where the first inequality follows from Assumption 1 Part 2; and the second inequality follows from
the property that p∗2 ≤ (1− θ) p∗1 ≤ p∗1, Assumption 2 that w1 > w2, and Assumption 1 Part 1.
This result contradicts the inequality above. Thus, we cannot have ν∗ = 0. Therefore, ν∗ > 0.
Following from the complementary slackness condition
ν∗ ((1− θ) p∗1 − p∗2) = 0,
we have p∗2 = (1− θ) p∗1.
In Part 1, the proofs for o = (θ, 0) or (θ, 1) with θ ∈ [0, 1] are analogous to the proof above, so
we omit these proofs.
Next, we prove Part 2.
First, we prove the first inequality of this part.
We use the optimal solution of the optimization problem J¯p≤ (θ, 2) with θ ∈ [0, 1] to construct a
feasible solution of the optimization problem J¯p≤ (θ, 0).
In the proof of this part, a variable with a superscript “∗”, such as p∗1, denotes the optimal value
of this variable in the optimization problem J¯p≤ (θ, 2).
Define
p1 = p∗1 + α1
N∗2
N∗
(w∗1 − w∗2) ,
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p2 = p∗2 − α2
N∗1
N∗
(w∗1 − w∗2) ,
m = m∗.
Hence,
p2 ≤ p∗2 = (1− θ) p∗1 ≤ (1− θ) p1,
where the equality holds, since p∗1 and p∗2 are feasible in the optimization problem J¯
p
≤ (θ, 2). There-
fore, (p1, p2,m) are feasible in the optimization problem J¯p≤ (θ, 0).
In the optimization problem J¯p≤ (θ, 0), under the decisions (p1, p2,m) constructed above, we
have
w1 = w2 =
N∗1w∗1 +N∗2w∗2
N∗
.
Hence, the number of type-i passengers who use LMTS is still N∗i .
Therefore, we have
J¯p (θ, 0)− J¯p (θ, 2) = J¯p≤ (θ, 0)− J¯p≤ (θ, 2)
≥ 1
h
(p1N∗1 + p2N∗2 )−
1
h
(p∗1N∗1 + p∗2N∗2 )
= 1
h
(α1 − α2) N
∗
1N
∗
2
N∗
(w∗1 − w∗2)
> 0,
where the first equality follows from the proof of Part 1; the first inequality follows from the property
that (p1, p2,m) is a feasible, but not necessarily an optimal, solution of the optimization problem
J¯p≤ (θ, 0); and the second inequality follows from Assumption 2 that α1 > α2 and the property that
w∗1 > w∗2 under the operating mode (θ, 2).
The proof of the second inequality of this part is analogous to the proof above, so we omit the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
In this proof, we denote by J¯SW≤ (o) the optimization problem (and also its optimal value) that is
only distinguished from the optimization problem for J¯SW (o) by replacing the equality constraint
for the prices p1 and p2 with the following inequality constraint:
p2 ≤ (1− θ) p1.
We denote Ni = µiqi for i ∈ {1, 2} and N = N1 +N2. We denote pij = ∂pi∂qj for i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Next, we prove Part 1. It is sufficient to show that the price inequality constraint above is
binding for any optimization problem J¯SW≤ (o) with o ∈ [0, 1]× {0, 1, 2}.
First, we consider o = (θ, 2) with θ ∈ [0, 1].
Define Ri (qi) , qiF¯−1i (qi). The optimization problem J¯SW≤ (o) is equivalent to the following
one:
max
q1,q2,m
1
h
(
µ1
(
R1 (q1)− α1wf (N2, N,m) q1
)
+ µ2
(
R2 (q2)− α2wf (0, N2,m) q2
))
−mc
+ 1
h
µ1
∫ ∞
v=F¯−11 (q1)
F¯1 (v) dv +
1
h
µ2
∫ ∞
v=F¯−12 (q2)
F¯2 (v) dv
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s.t. p2 ≤ (1− θ) p1
wf (N2, N,m) ≤ h
In this optimization problem, we denote by ν the dual variable associated with the constraint
p2 ≤ (1− θ) p1 and η the dual variable associated with the constraint wf (N2, N,m) ≤ h.
In the proof of this part, a variable with a superscript “∗”, such as p∗1, denotes the optimal value
of this variable in the optimization problem J¯SW≤ (o).
The optimal solution of this optimization problem satisfies the following KKT conditions:
µ1
h
(
R′1 (q∗1)− α1N∗1 ∂∂N∗wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)− α1w∗1
)
− µ1h
F¯1(α1w∗1+p∗1)
f1(α1w∗1+p∗1)
(9)
+ν∗ ((1− θ) p∗11 − p∗21)− η∗µ1 ∂∂N∗wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) = 0
and
µ2
h
(
R′2 (q∗2)− α2N∗2 ∂∂N∗2 w
f (0, N∗2 ,m∗)− α2w∗2
)
(10)
−µ2h α1N∗1
(
∂
∂N∗2
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + ∂∂N∗wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
)
− µ2h
F¯2(α2w∗2+p∗2)
f2(α2w∗2+p∗2)
+ν∗ ((1− θ) p∗12 − p∗22)− η∗µ2
(
∂
∂N∗2
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + ∂∂N∗wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
)
= 0.
The definition of Ri (qi) implies
R′i (qi) = pi + αiwi − F¯i(αiwi+pi)fi(αiwi+pi) .
We plug this equation into Equations (9) and (10). Suppose ν∗ = 0; then we have
p∗1 − 2
F¯1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
f1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
= α1N∗1
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + η∗h
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
and
p∗2 − 2
F¯2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
f2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
= α2N∗2
∂
∂N∗2
wf (0, N∗2 ,m∗)
+α1N∗1
∂
∂N∗2
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + α1N∗1
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
+η∗h
(
∂
∂N∗2
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) +
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)
)
≥ α1N∗1
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) + η∗h
∂
∂N∗
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) ,
where the inequality follows from the properties that
∂
∂nH
wf (nL, nH ,m) ≥ 0, ∂
∂nL
wf (nL, nH ,m) ≥ 0,
and the properties η∗ ≥ 0 and α2 ≥ 0.
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Hence,
p∗1 − 2
F¯1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
f1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
≤ p∗2 − 2
F¯2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
f2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
.
However, we have
p∗1 − 2
F¯1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
f1 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
> p∗1 − 2
F¯2 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
f2 (α1w∗1 + p∗1)
≥ p∗2 − 2
F¯2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
f2 (α2w∗2 + p∗2)
,
where the first inequality follows from Assumption 1 Part 2; and the second inequality follows from
the property that p∗2 ≤ (1− θ) p∗1 ≤ p∗1, Assumption 2 that w1 > w2 and Assumption 1 Part 1.
This result contradicts the inequality above. Thus, we cannot have ν∗ = 0. Therefore, ν∗ > 0.
Following from the complementary slackness condition
ν∗ ((1− θ) p∗1 − p∗2) = 0,
we have p∗2 = (1− θ) p∗1.
In Part 1, the proofs for o = (θ, 0) or (θ, 1) with θ ∈ [0, 1] are analogous to the proof above, so
we omit these proofs.
Next, we prove Part 2.
First, we prove the first inequality of this part.
We use the optimal solution of the optimization problem J¯SW≤ (θ, 2) with θ ∈ [0, 1] to construct
a feasible solution of the optimization problem J¯SW≤ (θ, 0).
In the proof of this part, a variable with a superscript “∗”, such as p∗1, denotes the optimal value
of this variable in the optimization problem J¯SW≤ (θ, 2).
Define
p1 = p∗1 + α1
N∗2
N∗
(w∗1 − w∗2) ,
p2 = p∗2 − α2
N∗1
N∗
(w∗1 − w∗2) ,
m = m∗.
Hence,
p2 ≤ p∗2 ≤ (1− θ) p∗1 ≤ (1− θ) p1,
where the equality holds, since p∗1 and p∗2 are feasible in the optimization problem J¯SW≤ (θ, 2).
Therefore, (p1, p2,m) are feasible in the optimization problem J¯SW≤ (θ, 0).
In the optimization problem J¯SW≤ (θ, 0), under the decisions (p1, p2,m) constructed above, we
have
w1 = w2 =
N∗1w∗1 +N∗2w∗2
N∗
.
Hence, the number of type-i passengers who use LMTS is still N∗i .
Therefore, we have
J¯SW (θ, 0)− J¯SW (θ, 2) = J¯SW≤ (θ, 0)− J¯SW≤ (θ, 2)
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≥ 1
h
(p1N∗1 + p2N∗2 ) +
1
h
(
µ1
∫ ∞
v=F¯−11 (q∗1)
F¯1 (v) dv + µ2
∫ ∞
v=F¯−12 (q∗2)
F¯2 (v) dv
)
−1
h
(p∗1N∗1 + p∗2N∗2 )−
1
h
(
µ1
∫ ∞
v=F¯−11 (q∗1)
F¯1 (v) dv + µ2
∫ ∞
v=F¯−12 (q∗2)
F¯2 (v) dv
)
= 1
h
(α1 − α2) N
∗
1N
∗
2
N∗
(w∗1 − w∗2)
> 0,
where the first equality follows from the proof of Part 1; the first inequality follows from the property
that (p1, p2,m) is a feasible, but not necessarily an optimal, solution of the optimization problem
J¯SW≤ (θ, 0); and the second inequality follows from Assumption 2 that α1 > α2, and the property
that w∗1 > w∗2 under the operating mode (θ, 2).
The proof of the second inequality of this part is analogous to the proof above, so we omit the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
In this proof, we denote Ni = µiqi for i ∈ {1, 2} and N = N1 +N2.
First, we prove the first inequality of this theorem.
We use the optimal solution of the optimization problem g (0) to construct a feasible solution
of the optimization problem g (2).
In the proof of this part, a variable with a superscript “∗”, such as p∗1, denotes the optimal value
of this variable in the optimization problem g (0).
Define w∗ = w∗1. Hence, w∗ = w∗2. Define
p1 = p∗1 − α1
(
wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗)− w∗
)
,
p2 = p∗2 + α2
(
w∗ − wf (0, N∗2 ,m∗)
)
,
m = m∗.
In the optimization problem g (2), under decisions (p1, p2,m) constructed above, we have
w2 = wf (0, N∗2 ,m∗) ,
w1 = wf (N∗2 , N∗,m∗) .
Hence, the number of type-i parcels delivered is still N∗i , and we have the property that
w∗ = N
∗
1w1 +N∗2w2
N∗
.
Therefore, we have
g (2)− g (0) ≥ 1
h
(p1N∗1 + p2N∗2 )−
1
h
(p∗1N∗1 + p∗2N∗2 )
= 1
h
(α2 − α1) N
∗
1N
∗
2
N∗
(w1 − w2)
> 0,
where the first inequality follows from the property that (p1, p2,m) is a feasible, but not necessarily
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an optimal, solution to the optimization problem g (2); and the second inequality follows from
Assumption 3 that α1 < α2, and the property that w1 > w2.
The proof of the second inequality of this theorem is analogous to the proof above, so we omit
the proof.
C. More Experimental Results
Optimal Price Served Passengers Jp JSW|p
(ppi , $) (60µi ∗ F¯i (ppi ) /h, #/hr) ($/hr) ($/hr)
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
θ i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2
0.0 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.77 256 249 245 247 159 135 335 307
0.1 0.71 0.64 1.24 1.12 254 263 0 155 144 121 338 181
0.2 0.70 0.56 1.40 1.12 258 278 0 155 128 121 343 181
0.3 1.60 1.12 1.60 1.12 0 155 0 155 121 121 181 181
0.4 1.87 1.12 1.87 1.12 0 155 0 155 121 121 181 181
0.5 2.24 1.12 2.24 1.12 0 155 0 155 121 121 181 181
0.6 2.80 1.12 2.80 1.12 0 155 0 155 121 121 181 181
0.7 3.73 1.12 3.73 1.12 0 155 0 155 121 121 181 181
0.8 5.60 1.12 5.60 1.12 0 155 0 155 121 121 181 181
0.9 11.20 1.12 11.20 1.12 0 155 0 155 121 121 181 181
Table 5: Station S2 Profit, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20, c = 4.
Optimal Price Served Passengers Jp|SW J
SW
(pSWi , $) (60µi ∗ F¯i
(
pSWi
)
/h, #/hr) ($/hr) ($/hr)
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
θ i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2
0.0 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 693 312 651 322 4 -11 412 394
0.1 0.40 0.36 0.00 0.00 679 318 647 330 2 -22 412 393
0.2 0.40 0.32 0.00 0.00 680 326 642 338 -12 -35 412 392
0.3 0.40 0.28 0.00 0.00 677 334 638 346 -24 -48 412 391
0.4 0.40 0.24 0.00 0.00 678 342 633 354 -39 -62 411 389
0.5 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.00 675 350 628 362 -52 -76 410 386
0.6 0.40 0.16 0.00 0.00 672 357 623 370 -66 -92 408 384
0.7 0.40 0.12 0.00 0.00 673 366 618 378 -83 -107 406 381
0.8 0.40 0.08 0.00 0.00 670 373 613 386 -98 -124 404 377
0.9 0.40 0.04 0.00 0.00 671 382 608 394 -116 -141 402 374
Table 6: Station S2 SW, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20, c = 4.
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Optimal Price Served Passengers Jp JSW|p
(ppi , $) (60µi ∗ F¯i (ppi ) /h, #/hr) ($/hr) ($/hr)
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
θ i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2
0.0 0.74 0.74 1.12 1.12 104 222 0 143 113 108 255 164
0.1 1.24 1.12 1.24 1.12 0 143 0 143 108 108 164 164
0.2 1.40 1.12 1.40 1.12 0 143 0 143 108 108 164 164
0.3 1.60 1.12 1.60 1.12 0 143 0 143 108 108 164 164
0.4 1.87 1.12 1.87 1.12 0 143 0 143 108 108 164 164
0.5 2.24 1.12 2.24 1.12 0 143 0 143 108 108 164 164
0.6 2.80 1.12 2.80 1.12 0 143 0 143 108 108 164 164
0.8 5.60 1.12 5.60 1.12 0 143 0 143 108 108 164 164
0.7 3.73 1.12 3.73 1.12 0 143 0 143 108 108 164 164
0.9 11.20 1.12 11.20 1.12 0 143 0 143 108 108 164 164
Table 7: Station S3 Profit, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20, c = 4.
Optimal Price Served Passengers Jp|SW J
SW
(pSWi , $) (60µi ∗ F¯i
(
pSWi
)
/h, #/hr) ($/hr) ($/hr)
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
θ i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2
0.0 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 342 288 324 298 -3 -22 311 298
0.1 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.34 337 294 318 303 -9 -29 311 297
0.2 0.39 0.31 0.37 0.30 331 299 319 311 -15 -43 311 296
0.3 0.39 0.27 0.39 0.27 329 306 312 316 -26 -50 310 295
0.4 0.38 0.23 0.38 0.23 331 314 314 323 -41 -65 309 293
0.5 0.38 0.19 0.38 0.19 330 321 316 331 -54 -81 308 291
0.6 0.40 0.16 0.38 0.15 319 327 319 338 -60 -98 307 289
0.7 0.37 0.11 0.37 0.11 339 335 323 345 -87 -116 305 287
0.8 0.40 0.08 0.35 0.07 318 341 330 353 -90 -136 303 284
0.9 0.40 0.04 0.30 0.03 316 348 351 360 -104 -164 301 281
Table 8: Station S3 SW, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20, c = 4.
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Low Valuation Median Valuation High Valuation
(v¯1 = 0.5, v¯2 = 1.0) (v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0) (v¯1 = 2.0, v¯2 = 4.0)
Jp($/hr) JSW|p ($/hr) Jp($/hr) JSW|p ($/hr) Jp($/hr) JSW|p ($/hr)PPPPPPPPθ
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
0.0 7 7 10 10 44 38 90 85 183 177 320 316
0.1 7 7 10 10 41 34 90 85 178 171 321 316
0.2 7 7 10 10 37 30 93 87 171 164 323 318
0.3 7 7 10 10 33 28 93 41 164 156 328 321
0.4 7 7 10 10 28 28 94 41 156 147 330 323
0.5 7 7 10 10 28 28 41 41 147 138 333 324
0.6 7 7 10 10 28 28 41 41 138 128 332 331
0.7 7 7 10 10 28 28 41 41 128 118 336 330
0.8 7 7 10 10 28 28 41 41 118 107 340 335
0.9 7 7 10 10 28 28 41 41 107 95 344 342
Table 9: Service Valuation Sensitivity. Station S1 Profit, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20, c = 4.
Low Valuation Median Valuation High Valuation
(v¯1 = 0.5, v¯2 = 1.0) (v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0) (v¯1 = 2.0, v¯2 = 4.0)
Jp|SW ($/hr) J
SW ($/hr) Jp|SW ($/hr) J
SW ($/hr) Jp|SW ($/hr) J
SW ($/hr)
PPPPPPPPθ
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
0.0 -1 1 25 21 1 -5 112 108 -1 -2 410 406
0.1 -2 1 25 21 -2 -7 112 107 0 -5 410 406
0.2 -5 1 25 21 -2 -10 112 107 -3 -8 410 405
0.3 -7 1 25 21 -5 -11 112 107 -5 -10 410 405
0.4 -11 1 24 21 -8 -19 111 106 -8 -13 410 405
0.5 -14 1 24 21 -10 -22 111 106 -10 -16 410 405
0.6 -17 1 23 21 -17 -26 111 105 -13 -29 410 405
0.7 -21 1 22 21 -20 -29 110 105 -14 -32 410 404
0.8 -24 1 21 21 -26 -33 110 104 -27 -36 409 404
0.9 1 1 21 21 -30 -39 109 103 -31 -40 409 403
Table 10: Service Valuation Sensitivity. Station S1 SW, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20, c = 4.
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Low Waiting Dis. Median Waiting Dis. High Waiting Dis.
(α1 = 6, α2 = 3) (α1 = 16, α2 = 8) (α1 = 30, α2 = 15)
Jp($/hr) JSW|p ($/hr) Jp($/hr) JSW|p ($/hr) Jp($/hr) JSW|p ($/hr)PPPPPPPPθ
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
0.0 62 55 117 111 44 38 90 85 37 34 77 74
0.1 59 51 117 113 41 34 90 85 33 30 78 76
0.2 55 47 118 114 37 30 93 87 29 26 79 76
0.3 51 42 118 115 33 28 93 41 25 25 39 39
0.4 47 38 121 113 28 28 94 41 25 25 39 39
0.5 42 33 120 116 28 28 41 41 25 25 39 39
0.6 37 32 121 49 28 28 41 41 25 25 39 39
0.7 32 32 122 49 28 28 41 41 25 25 39 39
0.8 32 32 49 49 28 28 41 41 25 25 39 39
0.9 32 32 49 49 28 28 41 41 25 25 39 39
Table 11: Waiting Disutility Sensitivity. Station S1 Profit, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, µS = 20, c = 4.
Low Waiting Dis. Median Waiting Dis. High Waiting Dis.
(α1 = 6, α2 = 3) (α1 = 16, α2 = 8) (α1 = 30, α2 = 15)
Jp|SW ($/hr) J
SW ($/hr) Jp|SW ($/hr) J
SW ($/hr) Jp|SW ($/hr) J
SW ($/hr)
PPPPPPPPθ
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
0.0 2 -5 146 142 1 -5 112 108 3 0 95 92
0.2 -2 -10 146 142 -2 -10 112 107 -4 -8 95 92
0.1 0 -8 146 142 -2 -7 112 107 0 -2 95 92
0.3 -4 -12 146 141 -5 -11 112 107 -7 -12 95 92
0.4 -5 -15 146 141 -8 -19 111 106 -11 -15 94 91
0.5 -7 -17 146 141 -10 -22 111 106 -15 -21 94 91
0.6 -9 -20 146 140 -17 -26 111 105 -21 -25 93 90
0.7 -10 -23 145 140 -20 -29 110 105 -25 -29 93 89
0.8 -22 -28 145 140 -26 -33 110 104 -30 -39 92 88
0.9 -25 -31 145 139 -30 -39 109 103 -34 -44 91 87
Table 12: Waiting Disutility Sensitivity. Station S1 SW, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, µS = 20, c = 4.
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Low Opt. Cost Median Opt. Cost High Opt. Cost
(c = 4) (c = 8) (c = 12)
Jp($/hr) JSW|p ($/hr) Jp($/hr) JSW|p ($/hr) Jp($/hr) JSW|p ($/hr)PPPPPPPPθ
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
0.0 44 38 90 85 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
0.1 41 34 90 85 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
0.2 37 30 93 87 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
0.3 33 28 93 41 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
0.4 28 28 94 41 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
0.5 28 28 41 41 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
0.6 28 28 41 41 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
0.7 28 28 41 41 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
0.8 28 28 41 41 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
0.9 28 28 41 41 18 18 26 26 10 10 13 13
Table 13: Operating Cost Sensitivity. Station S1 Profit, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20.
Low Opt. Cost Median Opt. Cost High Opt. Cost
(c = 4) (c = 8) (c = 12)
Jp|SW ($/hr) J
SW ($/hr) Jp|SW ($/hr) J
SW ($/hr) Jp|SW ($/hr) J
SW ($/hr)
PPPPPPPPθ
priority 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
0.0 1 -5 112 108 0 4 40 35 1 1 21 21
0.1 -2 -7 112 107 -4 4 40 35 1 1 21 21
0.2 -2 -10 112 107 -7 4 40 35 1 1 21 21
0.3 -5 -11 112 107 -14 4 39 35 1 1 21 21
0.4 -8 -19 111 106 -18 4 38 35 1 1 21 21
0.5 -10 -22 111 106 -24 4 38 35 1 1 21 21
0.6 -17 -26 111 105 -29 4 37 35 1 1 21 21
0.7 -20 -29 110 105 -34 4 35 35 1 1 21 21
0.8 -26 -33 110 104 4 4 35 35 1 1 21 21
0.9 -30 -39 109 103 4 4 35 35 1 1 21 21
Table 14: Operating Cost Sensitivity. Station S1 SW, v¯1 = 1.0, v¯2 = 2.0, α1 = 16, α2 = 8, µS = 20.
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